You Can't Tempt A Maverick

Spring 2003

You Can't Tempt A Maverick

How the Powers The Be Unwittingly

Facilitated Raiders' Owner Al Davis' Move

To Los Angeles

By Mark Bryant

In the summer of 1982, after a long, bitter court battle, Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis won the rights to move his National Football League franchise to Los Angeles, which ended a profitable and successful twenty-two year stay in the Bay Area. Many football fans have never forgiven Davis for uprooting the game's most successful franchise.

Many have pointed to the franchise's transfer to Southern California as the main reason for the decline of the Raiders success on the field in the late 1980's through the 1990's. Many have excoriated Davis for violation the sacred trust of community and team. The fact remains that Davis was ill-served by the National Football League; namely commissioner Pete Rozelle; and accommodated woefully by the city government of Oakland. Both, along with others, failed to meet the franchise's needs even halfway.

The result of this was a thirteen-year "extended vacation" for the Raiders football team. What follows is a portrait of how Rozelle and the city of Oakland grossly underestimated Davis, helping bring about an era of change in the way NFL owners do business. Today, owners are even more so all about the "bottom line," because they know there's always greener grass, not to mention greener dollar amounts awaiting them in distant shores.

In the summer of 1978, Los Angeles Rams owner Carroll Rosenbloom announced he was moving his team from the Los Angeles Coliseum to Anaheim effective with the 1980 season. Rosenbloom cited declining attendance during the previous two seasons and also claimed that the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission had not sufficiently met his demands for stadium improvements.

Rosenbloom did not seek league approval as was then league policy, he simply announced that his Rams would move to Anaheim Stadium in Orange County. This would set an ominous precedent for the Raiders, Rozelle, and the rest of the NFL, because he acted in pure defiance (Simmons, 174-75).

Speculation then mounted that another NFL team would seek greater Los Angeles as a home. Los Angeles Times columnist Jim Murray observed in his memoirs:

"The Raiders weren't the first to express interest in rushing into the L.A. vacancy. The Minnesota Vikings were. But the community there quickly sweetened the pot, promised a new stadium, keep the team. Robert Irsay, the Baltimore Colts owner, who had been dumb enough to effect a swap deal years before wherein he bought the L.A. Rams, then traded them even-up with Carroll Rosenbloom for Baltimore Colts, now lusted for a move to L.A."

But fear of reprisal by the league and alienation in their home ports kept these owners from actually bringing these plans to light (Murray, 165). Rozelle further endorsed Rosenbloom's Rams move to Anaheim by riling it a "suburban" move. In recent years, the New York Giants, Dallas, New England and Detroit franchises had all executed similar moves to new stadiums.

In order for a franchise to relocate, the NFL constitution stated in Rule 4.3 that an established team must gain a unanimous 28 votes. Twenty-one votes were required to move a team under the "suburban" clause.

Thus, for an NFL team to relocate and play in Los Angeles, a team would have to win approval by 28 votes, the number of franchises in the NFL in 1978 (Harris, 367).

Bill Robertson, member of the LAMCC, then approached Rozelle with the idea of getting a team to replace the Rams in the Coliseum. He received a less than enthusiastic answer; in fact Rozelle insinuated that not only would he do his best to discourage a team from relocating there. Also, Rozelle dropped hints that there was no guarantee if or when the NFL would expand next. Even if an expansion were to take place, Los Angeles would receive no more consideration initially than any other city without an NFL franchise (Harris, 388).

"They told Los Angeles to get in line with everyone else," a bitter Robertson said. (Harris, 394). From there, The LAMCC filed suit against the NFL, charging that the Rule 4.3 was an illegal restraint of trade and prevented the Coliseum form doing business with the NFL as desired (Simmons, 178).

While this was going on, Al Davis would soon drop the first gauntlet against Rozelle in October 1978. In the owners meeting to discuss the LAMCC lawsuit, the final vote was 27-0 with one abstention to change the approval for any franchise shift to 21 votes. The abstention vote belonged to Davis. He retorted to Rozelle: "If you are to call that unanimous, and it isn't, then I reserved my rights to move the Oakland Raiders as I see fit" (Harris, 402).

Davis maintained that he only said to the commissioner "I reserve my rights" (Simmons, 178). But the damage was done. The LAMCC eventually gave up the fight, but the Raider owner's lease was to expire following the 1979 season.

Many observers assumed that Davis was using the soon-to-be-vacant Los Angeles Coliseum merely as leverage against the City of Oakland, home of the Oakland Coliseum. On March 31 of that year, Davis mentioned to Rosenbloom that he was considering moving to Los Angeles. Three days later, Rosenbloom met an untimely death by drowning.

Rosenbloom's death had a significant impact on the possibilities of Davis moving. The Rams' owner had been considered a very powerful man within the league's infrastructure. It is speculated that Rosenbloom would not have come to Davis' aid, inasmuch as the Raider boss was disliked heavily around the league. More than likely, he would have double crossed him (Simmons, 179).

Rozelle had assured the City of Oakland that there was no serious possibility of Davis moving to Los Angeles and now convinced Georia Rosenbloom, the widow of Carroll, now in control of the Rams, that the Raiders were not coming to Los Angeles (Simmons, 180). Georgia had become upset after fans had waved a "Welcome Los Angeles Raiders" banner at the Raiders-Rams game on opening day of he 1979 season. This was precedent to a fan in Los Angeles-area bar yelling "The Los Angeles Raiders next year," As the Pittsburgh Steelers were winding down their Super Bowl win over the Rams at the end of that season (Los Angels Times, 15).

Meanwhile, Davis was expressing his usual dissatisfaction with the Oakland Coliseum Board and dropping his standard hints in the Bay Area press that the Coliseum was failing to meet his franchise's needs. Davis was further aggravated by his perception that the baseball Oakland A's received far better treatment in terms of home date, concessions and parking fees.

The A's, which had survived numerous threats by eccentric owner Charles O. Finley that he would relocate, had never drawn well at the Coliseum even as they were winning World Series in the early 1970's. The baseball-football configuration and multipurpose status of the Coliseum was also a disadvantage for the Raiders and for Al Davis, who by this time was seeking ways to gain added revenue in order to remain a leg up on his fellow owners.

"You know, they can talk about this guy and that guy, and this and that, but we all know who really built this stadium. We know who's had a commitment to excellence," said Davis (Harris, 438). "The last two years haven't gone as well as we would like (the Raiders had two disappointing- by their standards- seasons in 1978 and 1979) but we have done our part." Davis then added that the city and Coliseum Board were not doing their part (Harris, 439).

Few Oakland people seemed very concerned, because Davis had always been difficult to deal with in past negotiations, but had always eventually signed. This eime would not by any different, they reasoned (Simmons, 180).

Negotiations with Robertson of the LAMCC turned more serious in the 1980 off-season. Oakland powers-that-be continually denied the seriousness of Davis' wishes. Alameda County supervisor Joseph Bort expressed little concern: "Al Davis is rousing us to get a better deal for himself" (Simmons, 181).

Fellow supervisor Charles Santana did not share Bort's sentiments, as evidenced in Ira Simmons' book Black Knight: Al Davis and His Raiders:

"I think the bottom line is that somebody has got to talk to Al. Nothing is going to get settled this way. It's scary. We're to the point where Davis in essence can just say screw it."

To underscore this, Davis issued a warning to the Bay Area media on January 4, saying that the Oakland Coliseum Board "is a greedy organization." He also added an ominous warning that "this has gone on farther than you would assume" (Simmons, 181).

Davis then hired former San Francisco mayor Joseph Alioto, considered one of the best antitrust attorneys in the United States, as preparation for an all out court fight. On January 7, he met with Rozelle in New York. He reiterated that he would not seek league permission or a vote if he decided to move to Los Angeles. Rozelle responded that should Davis attempt to do so, severe penalties for violating league procedures could and would result (Harris, 467-68).

Now, the City of Oakland woke up to a ringing alarm (Harris, 472) and the result was that mayor Lionel Wilson established a task force to keep the Raiders in the East Bay. Jack Maltester, president of the Oakland Coliseum Board, scheduled a meeting with Davis on January 14.

One day prior to that meeting, Davis held a rare press conference in Oakland and proceeded to blast the OCB for failure to make him a priority. He then said: "The city that gets the team doesn't win you. The city that owns you now, loses you. The city that loses a team makes every effort next time not to lose. That's the situation with Los Angeles" (Simmons, 182).

Davis also compared his situation to baseball, saying that free agency was inevitable for pro football and that he wanted to be in the best possible place for financial prosperity and revenue opportunities should such a system come about tin the NFL. "I won't be somewhere where I can't compete," he said (Simmons, 183).

The feeling in the Bay Area by this time was that the Coliseum was entirely to blame for the situation. Oakland Tribune writer Dave Newhouse expressed pessimistic thoughts about an expansion team if the Raiders left Oakland and that Davis should be given what he desired (Simmons, 183).

But the Raiders rebuffed an offer by the city after Rozelle told the city to lower the financial agreements significantly. Rozelle did this because he was sure he would never allow Davis to move, regardless how bad the negotiations went in Oakland (Simmons, 187-88).

Mayor Harris then announced that the city was preparing an eminent domain suit to keep the Raiders in Oakland. If the eminent domain was to take place, the franchise would be taken away from Davis and his limited partnership and the city would assume control.

Davis, unmoved, signed an agreement to play in Los Angeles beginning with the 1980 season. He offered this as explanation: "Pro football in the 1980's must have comfortable stadiums. We didn't have any of the conveniences necessary to go forward in the Eighties. I don't mean to demean Oakland, but they're lagging behind" (Simmons, 183).

Despite the claims that Davis was merely using Oakland as ammunition to sweeten the pot in Los Angeles, and he same against Los Angeles for Oakland, there is evidence that Davis made every effort reasonable to remain in Oakland. He wanted the amenities- luxury boxes, club boxes, skybox seats- that were need to compete in the NFL's future. He gave Oakland plenty of opportunity to produce.

Oakland definitely couldn't match what Los Angeles group was offering in terms of monetary commitment, but this was mitigated by the proven fan base in the East Bay and Northern California. Once Rozelle's subterfuge caused the Oakland negotiations to sour, however, Davis' attitude changed (Simmons, 191-92).

Davis never asked for a ballot on his plan to move because he felt correctly that he would never gain league approval since Rozelle had stacked the deck against him. There were even reports that Rozelle wanted a Los Angeles expansion franchise for himself when he retired as commissioner, which he denied (Simmons, 193).

In the summer of 1980, the Raiders' plans to move to Los Angeles were placed on hold pending all the court activity and the eminent domain suit in Oakland. Meanwhile, the team continued to operate in the East Bay (Hession, 154).

The Raiders, forced to remain in Oakland, proceeded to win an improbable Super Bowl that season. Davis thoroughly enjoyed giving Rozelle his comeuppance as the commissioner was forced to hand him the Super Bowl trophy in the winning locker room in front of a national TV audience (Harris, 496).
In the 1981 off-season, the months were filled with litigation since all attempts at an out come court settlement were futile. On August 13, a mistrial was declared, which meant the Raiders would have to remain in Oakland for the upcoming season. In December of 1981, the Raiders rejected a lease proposal from the city of Oakland.

Then on May 7, 1982, a jury ruled in favor of the Raiders and Davis, clearing the way for a Raider move to Los Angeles. Oakland would attempt to force the eminent domain issue and force Davis' team back, but their bid was denied in appeals that took place over the next four years. "We showed Rozelle that you can't treat people like that," Alioto said jubilantly on the decision (Harris, 576). "When this is all said and done, I think the City of Oakland can sue Rozelle," Davis said (Harris, 577).

As precedent for the Raiders move, five other franchises would become dissatisfied with their stadium accommodations and move by century's end. The Baltimore Colts became the Indianapolis Colts and the St. Louis Cardinals became the Phoenix Cardinals. Then in a perverted display of Solomon-like wisdom, the NFL approved the move of he Cleveland Browns to Baltimore (to become the Ravens) and the Los Angeles Rams' move to St. Louis. The Houston Oilers would also relocate to Tennessee.

The vendetta of Rozelle against Davis ultimately cost the league millions of dollars and the commissioner's attempts to put the maverick owner in his place backfired mightily. The powers the be chose to underestimate Davis in taking him on and lost. In doing so, the map of football was changed dramatically.

Works Cited

Murray, Jim. Jim Murray: The Autobiography of the Pulitzer Prize Winning Sports

Columnist. New York: Macmillan, 1993.

Simmons, Ira. Black Knight: Al Davis and His Raiders. Rocklin, CA: Prima, 1990.

Harris, David. The League: The Rise And Decline of the NFL. New York: Bantam, 1986.

Hession, Joseph. Raiders: Collectors' Edition. San Francisco: Foghorn, 1991.

Los Angeles Times. "It Was Almost the Year of the Ram" 21 January 1980.